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of Subjecting

In Allred v. Graves,' the plaintiff, seeking compensatory and
punitive damages, alleged in her complaint that the nine defendants,
pursuant to a preconcerted conspiracy, came to her home where they
unlawfully and maliciously assaulted her and several members of
her family and shot into the automobiles and house of the plaintiff.
The defendants, in their answer, denied the assault on the plaintiff
or on anyone else. The plaintiff thereupon applied for an adverse
examination of the defendants, 2 which the clerk ordered.8 On the
day set for the examination the defendants appeared, and through
counsel moved to dismiss the order of examination on the grounds
that the plaintiff was seeking punitive damages; that should punitive
damages be awarded by the jury, the defendants' liberty could be
affected; and that consequently the order of examination would be
the equivalent of compelling the defendants to give evidence against
themselves which would be violative of the federal and state constitu4
tion.
In a hearing on the motion before the Judge of the Superior
Court, the parties stipulated that all the defendants had already been
tried for all criminal charges arising out of the occurrences. The
judge held that article I, section 11 of the Constitution of North
Carolina5 applied only to criminal actions, and that the defendant
The
would have to answer questions at the adverse examination.'
defendants appealed from this order.
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
trial judge was correct in refusing to dismiss the order for examination ;7 however, the court held that the defendants may not be compelled to answer questions at the examination the answers to which
261 N.C. 31, 134 S.E.2d 186 (1964).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-568.11(a) (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-568.11(b)
(Supp. 1963).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-568.11 (c) (1953).
' 261 N.C. at 33, 134 S.E2d at 188.
N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 11: "In all criminal prosecutions, every person
charged with crime has the right to... not be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence."
' 261 N.C. at 33, 134 S.E.2d at 189.
7Id. at 39, 134 S.E.2d at 193: The court held that a motion to dismiss the
order of examination' entirely was not proper, but that the order should be
modified so that the defendants should not be compelled to answer specific
questions which might tend to incriminate them.
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will necessarily tend to subject them to punitive damages or body
execution.8
The result is that North Carolina no longer applies the privilege
against self-incrimination solely to criminal actions, but also applies
the privilege to civil actions in which punitive damages are sought,
an award of which might subject the defendant to body execution.
In reaching this result, the court reasoned that it is well-accepted
law that a witness should not, in any proceeding, be compelled to give
testimony that will tend to incriminate him or subject him to fines,
penalties, or forfeitures ;9 that this constitutional guaranty should be
liberally construed ;"o that punitive damages are penal in nature, and
not compensatory;" and that, therefore, the defendants should not
be required to subject themselves to a penalty through self-incrimination. 2
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Counselman v.
Hitchcock,' held that the privilege against self-incrimination was
not confined only to criminal cases against the one invoking the
privilege. The Court held that broadly construing the Constitutional
privilege, no person should be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, that an investigation before a grand jury
was a criminal proceeding, and, therefore, the witness before such
jury was entitled to invoke the privilege.' 4 Further, the Court said,
in dictum: "The object was to insure that a person should not be
compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give
testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed
a crime."' 5
The next major deviation from the ancient doctrine that the
privilege pertained solely to criminal proceedings came in McCarthy
v. Arndstein.,' decided in 1924. In that case, the Supreme Court
squarely held that the privilege applied in all proceedings, both civil
and criminal.
8
id. at 38, 134 S.E.2d at 192.
9
Id. at 34, 134 S.E.2d at 189.
20 Ibid.
11

Id. at 36, 134 S.E.2d at 190.
at 38, 134 S.E.2d at 192.
142 U.S. 547 (1892).
142 U.S. at 562.
" Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
'*266 U.S. 34 (1924).
1? "The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to
22 Id.
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Since Counselman and Arndstein, it has been held that the privilege against self-incrimination may be exercised by a witness in any
proceeding.' Thus in all kinds of examinations before a court,"0
in grand jury investigations,2" in legislative or quasi-legislative investigations,2 1 in administrative investigations,2 2 and other type proceedings, the privilege had been held applicable. The conclusion
necessarily follows that no longer is there any problem as to the
kind of proceedings or investigations in which the privilege may be
invoked.
With this conclusion in mind, let us examine the type of facts
that are protected from disclosure. Wigmore says that: "The facts
protected from disclosure are distinctly facts involving a criminal
liability or its equivalent. Hence facts involving a civil liability are
entirely without the scope of the privilege."
Exactly what the
"equivalent" of criminal liability is has often eluded the courts.
Facts that might tend to subject the witness to infamy and public
disgrace are not protected by the privilege.24 In Ullmann v. United
States,2 5 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Federal Immunity Act of 1954 which authorized compelled testimony of witnesses in cases which involved the national security and
granted immunity from prosecution, penalty, or forfeiture arising
out of the testimony they were compelled to give. In Ullmann,
the petitioner had claimed that disclosure would disable him imcivil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject
to criminal
responsibility
him whoEVIDENCE
gives it." §2252
Id. at(1961)
40.
" See generally
8 WIGMORE,
[hereinafter cited
as WIGMORE] ; 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 433 (1957).
" E.g., Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958) (denaturalization
proceeding in a district court) ; United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.
1951) (upon forfeiture of bail; examination by district of trustees of bail
fund; privilege held waived); Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 270-72
(D.C. Cir. 1942) (preliminary hearing before committing magistrate);
Owen v. Fisher, 189 Misc. 69, 66 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (pretrial
examination
of defendant).
2" Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
2 Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) ; Quinn v. United States,
34922U.S.
Smith155v.(1955).
United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949) (before an OPA examiner) ; Graham v. United States, 99 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1938) (examination by immigration officers).
" 8 WIGMOa § 2254 at 331. (Emphasis added.) This section was
cited by the North Carolina court in Allred. 261 N.C. at 34, 134 S.E.2d at
189." Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker,

161 U.S.
591 (1896).
5350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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measurably-viz., loss of his job, expulsion from labor unions,
passport eligibility, and general public disgrace.26 However, the
majority, in rejecting these contentions, reiterated the rule enunciated
in Brown v. Walker,2 7 that the immunity need only protect the witness from exposure to a criminal charge; if he is sufficiently protected from criminal prosecution, he may not invoke the privilege. 8
The vigorous dissent in Ullmann agreed with the petitioner.
The dissenting justices, Douglas and Black, contended that forfeiture of rights of citizenship should be protected to the same
degree as property rights, and that the compelled testimony in
question would undoubtedly deprive the petitioner of some of his
valuable rights of citizenship.2 9 They further concluded that "the
Fifth Amendment was designed to protect the accused -against infamy as well as against prosecution." 30
Allred did not involve the claim that the facts sought to be disclosed might subject the defendants to infamy and public disgrace.
The dissent in Ullmann, however, does serve to show a liberal departure from the old rules requiring a strict interpretation of the
privilege against self-incrimination. If such a view were to prevail,
it would not require that the facts tend to subject the witness, to a
criminal liability, but only that such facts would deprive the witness
of his various rights of citizenship.
As previously stated, the privilege against self-incrimination is
ordinarily available only where a possible criminal prosecution may
result from the testimony.3 1 But the concept of "criminal prosecution" has been extended to include penalties and forfeitures which
are of a penal nature, and most jurisdictions have enacted this ex32
tension of the privilege as a statutory or constitutional provision.
"' Id. at 430.
27161 U.S. 591, 605-06 (1896).
21 350 U.S. at 430-31.
20350 U.S. at 442-43.

" 350 U.S. at 450. Wigmore suggests that the dissenters in both Ullmann
and Brown overlooked the fact that historically there is a difference in the
privilege against disclosing facts involving infamy and the privilege against
self-incrimination. 8 WIGMORE § 2254. See Smith v. United States, 337
U.S. 137 (1949) (pointing out the distinction). Although the privilege
against disclosing infamous facts has largely dissipated, several states have
preserved it by statute; see, e.g., ALASKA ComP. LAws ANN. § 58-6-12
(1948); CAL. CIV. PROC. CoDE § 2065 (1955) ; GA. CoDE § 38-1205 (1935);
S.C. CODE § 9-214 (1962). See also McCoRMicx, EvIDENcE § 128 (1954).

"' See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956); McCarthy
v. Arndstein,
266 U.S. 34 (1924).
2 See 8 WIGMORB §§ 2256-57.
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The words "penalty" and "forfeiture" have frequently been used
indiscriminately by the courts; for this reason, a shorthand definition
of each might be kept in mind during the remainder of this note.
A forfeiture may be said to be a loss resulting from the breach of a
stipulation imposed by the parties,"' while a penalty, on the other
hand, flows from the breach of a duty imposed by law.84
The North Carolina court, in Allred, considered the possibility
of having to pay punitive damages a penalty, and thereby extended
the privilege against self-incrimination to the defendants.8 5 The
court said: "When the penalty lies in the payment of money, the
Courts are in conflict."" At this point, the court quoted a footnote
from Wigmore37 which does in fact show that there has been a
conflict where a statute prescribes a fixed sum or a multiple of actual
loss for some act of the defendant. There has been no case, and
surely no "conflict," holding or rejecting the contention that a
possibility of punitive damages warrants the extension of the privilege against self-incrimination to the witness. In fact, the text to
which the above-mentioned footnote applies expressly says that if
the "penalty" is by way of punitive damages, it is still a civil liability
and in no way a criminal penalty.3"
The United States Supreme Court has extended the concept of
"criminal prosecution" to include penalties and forfeitures only
twice: in both cases the penalty or forfeiture was applied directly
as a punishment for a crime, viz., the forfeiture of imported goods
for failure to pay the applicable tariff, 9 and a civil penalty imposed
for the illegal importation of aliens.4 ° In both these cases, the
nature rather than the form of the action was controlling. The
penalty or forfeiture applied in each case was essentially punishment
for the violation of the applicable law.4 1
" See Chauncey v. Tahourden, 2 Atk. 392, 26 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ch. 1742).
' See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892).
11261 N.C. at 38, 134 S.E.2d at 192.
Id. at 36, 134 S.E.2d at 190.
8 WIGMORE § 2257 at 337 n.3.
38 "When the penalty lies in the payment of money, it seems clear that a
mere unregulated increase of compensation under the name of exemplary
damages is still a civil liability in essence, and therefore the same consequence
ought to follow when by statute a fixed sum, or multiple based on actual loss,
is prescribed." 8 WIGMORE § 2257 at 337. The cases cited by Wigmore as
authority for this statement show merely a conflict as far as the type of
statutes mentioned, and do not even mention exemplary damages.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 (1893).
"Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). "If an indictment had
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In all the cases that have followed the line of reasoning laid
down in the two above-mentioned cases, therefore, the nature of the
proceeding-that is, criminal-is the controlling factor, not the
form. For example, in early actions for treble damages under the
Emergency Price Control Act it was held that the privilege applied
for the reason that the statutory damages were not merely remedial,
but penal.42 Later opinions of the circuit courts would impliedly
overrule the earlier decisions of several district courts on this point,
holding the privilege inapplicable.43
Following the same reasoning, the privilege has been allowed in
courts of chancery under bills of discovery and under statutory
interrogatories to a party."

Wilson v. Union Tool Co.

5

was an

been presented against the claimants, upon conviction the forfeiture of the

goods could have been included in the judgment. If the government prose-

cutor elects to waive an indictment, and to file a civil information against
the claimants-that is, civil in form--can he by this device take from the
proceeding its criminal aspect and deprive the claimants of their immunities
as citizens, and extort from them a production of their private papers, or,
as an alternative, a confession of guilt? This cannot be. The information,
though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal

one.... As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the
commission of offences against the law, are of a quasi-criminal nature, we
think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for... that
portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id. at 634.
(Emphasis added.)
"2Bowles v. Trowbridge, 60 F. Supp. 48, 50 (N.D. Cal. 1945). See also
City of Philadelphia v. Cline, 158 Pa. Super. 179, 44 A.2d 610 (1945) (action
under municipal ordinance to recover penalties for failure to file tax returns;
privilege applies); Boyle v. Smithman, 146 Pa. 255, 23 AtI. 397 (1892)
(action to recover penalties for not posting a statement of business done,
under a statute declaring that the defendant "shall forfeit and pay" $1000 for
each act; privilege applies). The Trowbridge case was also decided on
another ground. The defendant had not yet been tried for the criminal
aspect of his act. Therefore, he could not be required to give evidence that
could be later used against him. 60 F. Supp. at 50. This was the entire
basis of the decision in Porter v. Heend, 6 F.R.D. 588 (N.D. Il. 1947). The
court in Portersaid in a suit for treble damages under the Emergency Price
Control Act that it need not even consider whether the damages were
remedial or penal, because the defendant would not be required to answer
anygay.
"Crary v. Porter, 157 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1946). "In addition, mere
increased or multiple damages, whether they be for exemplary or other
public-interest purposes, whose allowance is dependent upon the recovery of
actual damages, have never been regarded as constituting a criminal penalty."
Id. at 414. See also Kessler v. Fleming, 163 F.2d 464. (9th Cir. 1947)
(action under Emergency Price Control Act for treble damages; might be
considered a "penalty," but it is only remedial and not a substitute for
criminal prosecution); Amato v. Porter, 157 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1946).
"Speidel Co. v. N. Barstow Co., 232 Fed. 617 (D.R.I. 1916).
"'275Fed. 624 (S.D. Cal. 1921).
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action brought for treble damages for patent infringement; in denying discovery, a California district court followed the rule of equity
which denies discovery if the answer solicited would tend to subject
the party to a penalty, forfeiture or criminal process.4" However,
the same court, two years later in Perkins Oil Well Cementing Co. v.
Owen,4 7 completely reversed itself, though not expressly overruling
Union Tool. Perkins held that the statute allowing treble damages
.was remedial; that the action was to redress a private aggrievance;
that the defendant would not, by any disclosure, make himself liable
to prosecution for any public offense. Therefore, no constitutional
right would be invaded by compelling him to answer the interrogatories.4" Another court in the same circuit was again faced with
the question in Schlage Lock Co. v. Pratt-Ryner Co.4 It acknowledged the inconsistency of the two previous cases, Union Tool and
Perkins, and adopted the rule of the latter.
Another line of cases cited as authority for the Allred decision
would not seem to be applicable at all.80 In all four of these cases,
a Mississippi immunity statute was held to protect the defendants
from any prosecution, penalties, or forfeitures arising out of the
illegal sale of liquor. It is submitted that the Mississippi court was
not concerned with whether or not the penalties came within the
concept of "criminal prosecution" for the reason that it found that
the clear import of the immunity statute was to protect the witnesses
from any penalty arising from the facts testified to, be it penal or
remedial.5 1
Where the punishment imposed is not penal, but remedial, there
was no holding prior to Ullmann by the Supreme Court as to whether
the privilege was applicable. The Court had considered the concept
of "remedial forfeiture" only once, in United States v. Hess,52 and
then in terms of double jeopardy, not of self-incrimination. In
that case, the recovery, for the violation of a public housing act
after the imposition of criminal sanctions, of double damages plus
"Id. at 629-30.
293 Fed. 759 (S.D. Cal. 1923).

293 Fed. at 761.
" 46 F.2d 703 (N.D. Cal. 1931).
Bailey v. Muse, 227 Miss. 51, 85 So. 2d 918 (1956) ; Zambroni v. State,
217 Miss. 418, 64 So. 2d 335 (1953); Serio v. Gully, 189 Miss. 558, 198 So.
307 (1940); Malouf v. Gully, 187 Miss. 331, 192 So. 2 (1939).
"Bailey v. Muse, 227 Miss. 51, 56-57, 85 So. 2d 918, 922-23 (1956),
brings this point out very clearly.
52317 U.S. 537 (1943).
48
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a penalty was held not to violate the constitutional guaranty against
double jeopardy. The Court ruled that the double damages and the
penalty were imposed merely to compensate the government for the
damage done by the violations of the act, i.e., the penalties were
remedial, not penal.
From the above discussion, it may be seen that the only cases
which hold the privilege against self-incrimination applicable where
the witness may be subject to "penalties" by way of payment of
money are those in which the courts feel that the "penalty" is not
remedial, but criminally penal; ones where the damages sought are
imposed as a criminal penalty or substitute therefore, and not where
they are intended to compensate private aggrievances. Admittedly,
punitive damages are "penal," as the court in Allred stresses ;" also
it is true that the defendants might become subject to body execution
upon failure to pay the judgment for such damages. It is submitted, however, that the damages are not penal within the concept
of "criminal prosecution," even though the defendants, in furtherance of their civil liability, might be jailed by means of body execution, and that the court erred by overlooking the distinction between
merely "penal" damages which are in essence merely a further civil
liability, and "penal" damages which come within the concept of
"criminal prosecution," to which the privilege against self-incrimination extends only.
ARCH K. SciiocHr IV

Constitutional Law-Was it Intended That the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Supreme Court in 1833 established the principle that the
Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.1 Following the Civil War
the fourteenth amendment, with its "privileges or immunities" and
"due process" clauses, cast doubt on this principle and raised the
possibility of applying the Bill of Rights to the states by incorporating them into the amendment.'

53 261 N.C. at 35, 134 S.E.2d at 190.
'Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides: "All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of

